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Report

Challenges of Designing an
Optimal Petroleum Fiscal Model
in Latin America
By Roger Tissot

T

he ability to replace
hydrocarbon reserves
is influenced by the
level of investment in
exploration activities.
Governments have two options for
conducting exploration activity: 1)
investing in exploration activities
directly; or 2) asking private
companies to make the investments.
In the first case, the ability of
the entity – usually the National
Oil Company (NOC) – to make
investments depends on the skill
level of the country’s workforce, the
government’s financial capabilities,
its aversion to risk, and the level of
financial and strategic independence
of the NOC from other government
authorities.
Political authorities tend to
be risk averse and would prefer
to use scarce financial resources
for projects aimed at improving
social conditions or economic
development. Their investment
preferences are also influenced
by political ideology and the
preferences of their constituencies.
The NOC has to compete with
other government authorities for the
funding to make its investments.
The more dependent on NOC
revenues the government is, the less
independence will be granted to the
NOC. In this case, the NOC is more
likely to be risk averse, focus most
investments on sustaining production
from existing wells, and implement
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only modest exploration activities in
the most prospective areas.
Sometimes NOCs manage to
achieve a high level of independence
from the government despite
being their main source of cash.
The sustainability of NOC
“independence” depends upon
three factors: 1) its ability to meet
the government’s financial needs;
2) its capacity to produce and
replace reserves efficiently; and 3)
endorsement of NOC strategic
activities by top-level political
authorities. If these conditions are
not met, the result is often a cashstarved and risk-averse NOC unable
to carry out exploration alone.
The other option is for
governments to offer the rights
for developing the resource via
concessions to international oil
companies (IOCs), or to partner
with them in exchange for a share
of production or profits. The
option selected depends on the
government’s choice of petroleum
fiscal models.
The different “families” of
models represent legal contracts
or agreements covering rights
granted over a period of time and
for an agreed level of activity. The
difference between these systems
mostly involves the mechanics of
risk and reward sharing between
the contractor and the government.
Fiscal models can be more or less
progressive depending on when

the rents are captured: the later
the payment is required, the more
progressive the system is.
The main challenge in the
design of optimal fiscal system is
to achieve alignment of different
and sometimes diverging objectives
between the government and the
IOC. The government’s primary
objective is to maximize the value
of its petroleum resources while
attracting sufficient interest from
IOCs to invest in E&P activities.
IOCs in turn seek to ensure that
the rate of return on the capital
employed is consistent with the
project’s risk and with the strategic
objectives of the corporation.
Latin American Experience
Latin America has been a fertile
ground for petroleum fiscal models.
Whether the region’s policies are
open or closed usually obeys shifts
in the political pendulum from
populism to economic orthodoxy.
In the 1990s, therefore, Latin
America adopted market-oriented
models, reduced government take,
ended NOC monopolies and,
in some cases, privatized them.
The private sector response was
positive, resulting in rapid growth
of reserves and production. Most of
the fiscal models, however, failed to
respond to the steep price increases.
That failure coincided with the
rise of new populist regimes that
relied on resource nationalism as
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Oil Reserves and Production
Figure 1 shows the evolution
of petroleum reserves in Latin
America from the 1990s through
2009. Reserves increased modestly
(0.7% on average) from 1990 to
2005, followed by a drastic jump
since then.
Figure 2 shows the change in oil
reserves in the main oil-producing
countries of Latin America between
2004 and 2009. Venezuela explains
most of the jump in reserves over
the last few years. This is not
“new oil” but rather a change in
the definition of already recorded
reserves from the heavy crude oil
Orinoco fields. Brazil has increased
its reserves almost constantly in
the last two decades, due in part
to more active exploration efforts
by Petrobras, the Brazilian NOC,
and IOCs since the opening of the
sector a decade ago. Brazil has also
captured international headlines
since 2008 due to huge discoveries
of pre-salt oil, described as a “game
changer” for Brazil’s petroleum
outlook. The country is expected to
become an important oil exporter in
the next decade.
Latin America’s oil production
peaked at 10.65 million b/d in
2005. Since then, production has

Figure 1
South America and Mexico Oil Reserves (billion b) and % Change

Figure 2

Changes in Latin American Oil Reserves 2009-2004 (billion b)

Latin A
America Change Reserves Billion b

a key component of their political
platforms.
Since this most recent “turn to
the left,” Latin America has faced
two very different paths with regard
to oil policy. The first favors state
corporatism and maximization of
rents even at the cost of investments
and additional reserves. This is the
case of Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador
and, to a certain degree, Brazil
and Argentina. The second path
advocates strengthening marketoriented models, resulting in a
boom in investments in Colombia,
Peru and, to a lesser extent, Trinidad
& Tobago.

Figure 3

Changes in Oil Production 2004-2009
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slowly declined to less than 10
million b/d. Average production
changes since 2005 on a country
basis show Mexico with the biggest
decline, followed by Venezuela,
Argentina and Ecuador. Gains were
made in Brazil, Colombia and Peru.
Petroleum Policy Outlook
According to a recent report by
the Fitch Rating agency, capital
expenditures by the largest five
Latin American NOCs could reach
US$550 bn in the next five years.
Coinciding with the ambitious
expansion plans is a deterioration
of fiscal balances in the region due
to increased spending caused by
the fiscal stimulus in 2009 and
natural disasters during the 2010
rainy season.
Countries that were seen as
“business friendly” have become
victims of their own success. Access
to land is becoming more expensive
28
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and governments have imposed
higher taxes and royalties and/or
stricter qualifying requirements
for IOCs. Resource-nationalist
countries have experienced a drastic
decline in production and, in
some cases, reserves. The economic
sustainability of these countries
is tied to new investments. There
is uncertainty about local NOCs’
abilities to meet the investment
challenge, while foreign investors
would expect a reward attractive
enough to compensate for political
and fiscal risks.
In the last decade, some
countries have successfully
increased their hydrocarbon
reserves, with high rents for
governments, increased investment
and attractive rates of return for
investors. It would be tempting
to “copy” the fiscal models
of successful countries, but a
successful fiscal model must reflect

the political, social and economic
characteristics of the host country.
In some countries, allowing
concessions to IOCs may be seen
as highly offensive, for historical
reasons. In others, the need to
secure new reserves to postpone
the need to import oil is a
sufficient incentive to grant IOCs
attractive fiscal conditions.
The main challenge in Latin
America is to design petroleum
fiscal models that are flexible
enough to incorporate price
volatility and political change and
stable enough to allow private
investors to focus on long-term
development. ■
Roger Tissot is an economist and
independent consultant focusing
on Latin American energy policy,
markets and strategy, advising mostly
Canadian and international oil and
gas companies.

